On the 30th of June, the United Nations (UN) Security Council cast a unanimous vote, marking the end of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), with its mission to close on the final day of 2023. This action followed a plea from Mali’s transitional government to hasten the mission’s withdrawal.
MINUSMA commenced in July 2013 following the liberation of Northern Mali from armed groups, which had been under their control since 2012. The liberation operation was spearheaded by a Franco-African military initiative, launched in early 2013.
The country, however, took a shift in alliances, leading to a reduction in international security response to the Sahel crisis. Mali exited the G5 Sahel in May 2022, subsequently leading to the withdrawal of the French-led Barkhane and Takuba forces. This departure mirrors Mali’s altered approach following its second coup in May 2021 and the resulting diplomatic stand-off with France.
This strategic realignment was prompted by Mali’s dissatisfaction with the decade-long partnerships and an escalation in diplomatic and geopolitical tensions – aggravated by the Ukraine conflict – which strained Mali’s regional partnerships. Relations with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the G5 Sahel took the hardest hit, as Mali’s transitional government considered them under French influence.
With France at the helm of MINUSMA’s initial political and military configuration and its continued influence over the Malian situation at the UN Security Council, Mali’s mistrust of the mission grew. The transitional government reproached the West’s politicisation of human rights, amidst allegations of civilian deaths and abuses during operations conducted by the Malian Armed Forces post-2022. Adding to this was MINUSMA’s perceived inadequacy in counter-terrorism operations.
Despite this, the cessation of MINUSMA presents potential risks to Mali’s political, security, and humanitarian landscape. The government’s confidence in handling these challenges without MINUSMA, though clear, requires a well-defined alternative strategy.
Mali seems to be pivoting towards Russia for military support and fostering bilateral relations with immediate neighbours. However, reliance on external entities for financial or technical assistance could impose constraints on the effectiveness and sustainability of such solutions.
This presents a crucial role for the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS in supporting Mali’s government initiatives. These organisations need to learn from their previous interventions during the crisis inception. They were effective in promoting dialogue and mobilising troops, but found themselves sidelined during the organisation and management of the political and military response in 2013.
To address internal political and security challenges, both the AU and ECOWAS must galvanise diplomatic resources and support international mediation, primarily led by Algeria. The objective should be to relaunch the peace agreement’s implementation. Algeria’s new status as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council will further boost African efforts in this direction.
An all-encompassing approach is necessary, integrating non-military measures such as weakening extremist groups by targeting their supply and funding chains, and delivering essential public services to vulnerable regions.
The conclusion of MINUSMA signifies an opportunity for more robust African leadership in the region, allowing for a constructive reshaping of multilateral relations that have been marred by institutional rivalries. It provides an avenue for ECOWAS and the AU to champion African solutions.
In the light of lessons learnt from a decade of interventions in the Sahel, it is crucial for national and multilateral actors to collaborate. The region, at a crossroads, may struggle to weather another decade of instability.
